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RACIAL DISCRIMHNATION AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS*
ARTHiuR S. MILLER**

IV.

THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE EDUCATION

It is clear that the public school administrators are not the only
educators who are deeply concerned with racial discrimination.
Some of their colleagues in private and denominational schools also
face serious problems. Of course these are of a different type, being
concerned for the most part with the reaction which may take place
in the wake of a private school's decision to integrate the races in
its student body. The private school administrator has not had to
grapple with problems of imposed integration. His have been or will
be voluntarily shouldered. Suppose, however, the decision is made
to attempt to extend the principle of the Segregation Cases into
nonpublic education. Suppose in other words, there is an attempt
made to break down existing racial barriers to admission in private
schools. Would such an attempt succeed? A development of this
as yet nonexistent but nevertheless foreseeable?' problem area will
be made in this section.
That this problem is something more than academic is evident
from what is the apparent over-all program of the Negro. His aspirations would seem to include that of full and complete status in the
*This is the last half of a study on Racial Discrimination and Private
Schools. The first half appears in this volume at page 145. Much of the re-

search for this study was made possible through a grant from the Fund for
the Republic. All statements made and all conclusions drawn are, however,
solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the officers and
directors of the Fund. '
**Associate Professor of Law, Emory University.
94. Compare the attempt to break down the racial barriers at Girard
College, a private school in Philadelphia. See, e.g., Gordon, The Girard College Case: Desegregation and a Municipal Trust, 304 Annals 53 (March,
1956). Compare, also, the Fair Education Practices Acts of New York and
New Jersey; Note, 64 Harv.L. Rev. 307 (1950).
In 1955 a determined effort was made to require all members of the
Association of American Law Schools to eliminate racial barriers to admission. A policy of non-segregation was to be made a condition of becoming
or remaining a member. The Association includes both private and public
law schools. The attempt was defeated in a close vote at the 1955 convention of the Association. For an account of this attempt to desegregate private
as well as public schools, see Association of American Law Schools, 1955 Proceedings 249-71 (1956).
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social structure, not merely the elimination of official acts of discrimination, although those acts are the focal point of present-day
attacks. "Integration" may be considered to be a concept which carries with it a good deal more than merely commingling whites and
non-whites in the same public schools. The goal may be considered
to be not only formal equality of treatment by official bodies and
governmental institutions but full and complete participation in all
societal institutions, both those labelled "public" and those termed
"private." The Negro in the United States has not in the past and
does not now want a form of society which will preserve his special
cultural characteristics or racial attributes. He wants an equal position with full status in white culture and complete participation in
white institutions.95 "What the Negro wants is first-class citizenship without any reservations. He wants nothing not compatible
with democracy and the Constitution. On the contrary, his demand
is that he share equally in American democracy under the Constitution and participate fully in American life." 6
It appears, further, that the Negro movement in the United
States is, when viewed in perspective, part of a world-wide movement by colored peoples for status. In other countries it takes the
form of anti-colonialism and nationalism, of violence and strife.
Here it takes the form of achieving goals through the use of legal
tactics and strategy in a constitutional framework. But the aim is
the same, even though there is no outward identification with different national groups and no verbalization of the essential identity
of interest. "The thoughtful American Negro," it has been said,
95. In now-famous legal language, the Negro does not want "separate
but equal" treatment in any important activity. See What the Negro Wants
(Logan ed. 1944) for statements of Negro leaders of the aspirations of the
American colored citizens. In Rowan, What Do Negroes Really Want?, Look,
April 3, 1956, p. 34, a leader of the Louisiana NAACP is quoted as follows:
"'Many years ago, we asked for school equalization. Then, we couldn't get
it; now we don't want it. We want nothing less than total integration in all
facets of American life-and we won't stop until we get it.'"
In the same article, a Negro teacher is quoted as follows: "There is
nothing complicated about what we want. We just want the same things
other Americans want-the same opportunities, rights and responsibilities."
See Richardson, What the Negro Wants. 11 New South, No. 1, p. 8 (Jan.
1956).
96. Davie, Negroes in American Society 455 (1949). Despite the statement quoted in the text, no systematic survey of the aspirations of the
Negroes have been made. The statements of Negro leaders are available but
they are usually couched in generalities so that it is difficult to ascertain the
Negro position on any particular issue. The problem is one which cries out
for careful analysis and exploration, as is its other side, the problem of
learning exactly what it is that the white man fears or dislikes in the Negro.
Some exact knowledge of the facts in both areas should help displace some
of the emotion and extreme statements usually heard.
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"shares with almost all the other coloured peoples of the world a
desire to improve the status of his people in relation to the white
97
race."
It is, accordingly, not fanciful to raise and discuss the question
of possible attempts to open the doors of private education. At some
time in the future the private school administrator is likely to have
to meet the problem head-on.
Moving as he does through legal channels, the Negro can choose
between two alternatives in his pursuit of improved social status.
He can attempt to have legislation enacted or he can go to court
and try for favorable judicial reaction. His choice will no doubt be
conditioned by the state in which the action is brought. For example,
in New York a successful movement in the legislature has resulted
in the enactment of a Fair Educational Practices Act.9 This statute,
which is a part of the series of New York statutes designed to combat discrimination in privately owned and operated establishments,
makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of race, color or religion
in the admission of students to private schools. Other states have
statutes which, even before the decision in the Segregation Cases,
forbade racial discrimination.99
The main focus of the Negro has, however, been on the judiciary.
Recognizing the complete impossibility of getting qny favorable
legislation enacted in even the border states, to say nothing of the
deep South, the courts and the judicial process have been resorted
to. And it is the federal, not -the state, courts which have been
the primary vehicle. For, ultimately, it is the federal Constitution
which is invoked in aid of the demand for equality. 100 Ultimately,
also, it will be the United States Supreme Court which will be
called upon to make the authoritative pronouncement should a
movement to open private education be made. Would that Court,
97. Article entitled "The American Negro" in The London Times,
July 23, 1952, p. 7. See van der Post The Dark Eye in Africa (1955).
98. N.Y. Educ. Law § 313. This act is modelled on the Fair Employment Practices Acts which several states have enacted. The New York
statute has the following declaration of policy: "It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the state that the American ideal of equality of opportunity requires that students, otherwise qualified, be admitted to educational institu-

tions without regard to race, color, religion, creed or national origin. ..."
For a discussion of this and other similar statutes, see Note, 64 Harv. L.
Rev. 307 (1950).
99. These statutes are collected in Murray, States' Laws on Race and

Color (1950) (Supp. 1955).
100. It is for more than political reasons (the inability of getting an
act through Congress) that the Supreme Court not Congress, has been the
vehicle used by the Negro. Congress, under existing interpretation, has no

authority to legislate in the field of racial relations. See text at pp. 176-77, infra.
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under existing and foreseeable legal doctrine and constitutional interpretation, extend the principle of nondiscrimination to encompass all of education?
A. The Constitutional Concept of "State Action"
We can start with the Segregation Cases themselves and some
of the language used by Chief Justice Warren. An important part
of the decision, derived not from express language but as a gloss
from the entire opinion, is the Court finding a national interest in
education, a concern for the child and his development over and
above that of the parents and of the local community. The Chief
Justice made statements which are perhaps the most extreme yet
uttered by the Court on the subject of education:
[We recognize] the importance of education to our democratic
society.
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa0
tion.' '
Language such as that buttresses the view that the societal interest in education is overriding, and transcends the interests of the
parents in addition to that of the child. The Court, in using this
language, has made an important recognition of a concept which
may have far-reaching ramifications. It is possible that it has created the basis for mounting an attack on the citadel of private
learning. Does the finding of a national interest in education, when
added to the further finding that enforced racial segregation generated feelings of inferiority in the objects of discrimination, suggest
that it is a logical step to require integrated education wherever
carried on ?112
It is difficult to forecast what the Supreme Court will do with
a case once it is before it. Absent a concrete factual situation out
101. The quoted statements are taken from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See School District v. Alamance County,

211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873 (1937), in which the Supreme Court of North
Carolina characterized education as a "sacred duty" of the state.
102. Such a fear has been expressed. See Valenti, Woelfl & Shanihnessy, A Double Revolution? The Supreme Court's Desegrcgation Decision,
25 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1 (1955). The authors are members of the faculty of
Loyola University in Chicago.
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of which the legal and constitutional question is posed, prediction
of a future decision is often erroneous. It is possible, however, to
discuss the problem area, to point out lines of development in the
past, and to attempt an extrapolation. What obstacles would an
attempt to force the doors of private education open have to surmount? The chief roadblock is the language of the Constitution
itself and an almost unbroken line of interpretation since 1872. The
pertinent part of the Constitution is the fourteenth amendment and
its provision that "[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ...."
The key word is "state," for it is in that word that the concept
of state action finds its source and its validity. The Constitution,
it is often said, "runs against governments only." Thus, those who
would break down the barriers in private education must present
a factual situation from which it will be possible for the Justices
of the Supreme Court to draw the conclusion that the state is
somehow intimately involved in privately-controlled education. In
the SlaughterhouseCases,03 decided in 1872 by the Supreme Court,
it was said that the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment apply
only to the actions of state governments and do not apply either to
private individuals or to private institutions. Since that time there
has been an evolutionary development of the concept of state action.
The result is that today it is possible to predict with fair accuracy
whether a particular factual situation so involves a state as to bring
it within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. So far as education is concerned the short answer is that the Court has not
extended the concept of state action to include anything more than
that publicly controlled. Nor, to hazard a guess, is it likely that it
would now or in the immediate future. However, it has been said
that the "Court has shown that the concept of private action must
yield to a conception of state action where public functions are being
performed."'01 4 Hence, this inquiry.
1. One Line of Judicial Development
It is, as noted above, state action which deprives a person of due
process of law or denies him equal protection of the laws that is
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. But the Supreme Court
has never drawn a precise and definitive line between what is of103. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
104. Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem, in Federalism: Mature and
Emergent 159, 162 (MacMahon ed. 1955).
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ficial (state) action and what is purely private. However, it has
consistently held to the requirement that action (or nonaction, in
some cases) by some official or organ of the state is a necessary
prerequisite to setting the fourteenth amendment in motion. In
°
the Civil Rights Cases'"
in 1883, Mr. Justice Bradley stated that
"it is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of
the amendment." But even before that, the Court had already extended the amendment to actions of individuals exercising state
powers, whether they were following state law or not. 10 Thus the
amendment applies to more than statutes and the actions of state
officials in compliance with statutes. Later on the Court went even
further and held that acts of state officials, not only unauthorized
by state law but even when prohibited by it, were within the pur07
view of the amendment.
Thus the concept of state action has been an expanding one
which has apparently not yet completed its evolution: Two parallel
lines of developments are discernible: (1) that noted above in which
it can be said that action by any official performing state duties or
any organ of the state falls within the concept, and (2) the line of
cases which have applied the concept to officials and organizations
with no direct connection with the state but which exercise functions similar to those of the state. In both of these situations, the
tendency has been for the Court to bring more and more under the
tent of state action. Whether this is the "camel's nose soon to be
followed by the entire animal" remains to be seen.
In addition to those noted above, other cases have added to the
doctrinal development of the concept of state action. In Virginia
v. Rives,108 a case involving exclusion of Negroes from the jury

in a trial of a Negro for murder, Mr. Justice Field uttered the following relevant language in a concurring opinion:
If an executive or judicial officer exercises power with
which he is not invested by law, and does unauthorized acts,
the State is not responsible for them. The action of the judicial
officer in such a case, where the rights of a citizen under the
laws of the United States are disregarded, may be reviewed and
corrected or reversed by [the Supreme Court]: it cannot be
105. 109 U.S. 3,11 (1883).
106. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
107. See, e.g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278 (1913) ; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
See also Hale, UnconstitutionalActs as Federal Crimes, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 65,
78-90 (1946).
108. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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imputed to the State, so as to make it evidence that she in her
sovereign or legislative capacity denies the rights invaded, or
refuses to allow their enforcement. It is merely the ordinary
case of an erroneous ruling of an inferior tribunal. Nor can the
unauthorized action of an executive officer, impinging upon the
rights of the citizen, be, taken as evidence of her intention or
policy so as to charge upon her a denial of such rights.0 2
This attempt to engraft the normal rules of agency law upon
the Constitution-the agent acting beyond the scope of his authority
cannot bind his principal-found Court cognizance and acceptance
in 1904. At that time, a unanimous Court held that the action of
a state administrative body, which had been taken in direct violation of a state statute, could not be state action "within the intent
and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." In the words of Chief
justice Fuller, "it is for the state courts to remedy acts of state
officers done without the authority of or contrary to state law.""10
But that was the last time the Court was willing to take such
a position. Three years later it receded from that view. In Raymond
v. Chicago Traction Co.' it found state action in a case where a
state board of tax equalization failed, contrary to the state constitution, to make a uniform property valuation for tax purposes.
A violation of due process was found over the dissenting voice of
Justice Holmes who stated that he was "unable to grasp the principle on which the State is said to deprive the appellee of its property without due process of law because a subordinate board, ...
is said to have violated the express requirement of the State in its
constitution.... I should have thought that the action of the State
was to be found in its constitution, and that no fault could be found
with that until the authorized interpreter of that constitution, the
Supreme Court [of the state], had said that it sanctioned the alleged wrong." The new position of the Court was underscored in
1913 in a case which clearly refuted the earlier (Holmes') position: "[W]here a state officer under an assertion of power from
the state is doing an act which could only be done upon the predicate that there was such power, the inquiry as to the repugnancy
of the act to the fourteenth amendment cannot be avoided by insisting that there is a want of power. That is to say, a state officer
cannot on the one hand as a means of doing a wrong forbidden by
the Amendment proceed upon the assumption of the possession of
state power and at the same time for the purpose of avoiding the
109. Id. at 334.

110. Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 438 (1904).

111.

207 U.S. 20, 41 (1907).
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application of the Amendment, deny the power and thus accomplish
the wrong."'11
To further buttress the view that action illegal under state law
may still be state action are two more recent cases. In Iowa-Dcs
Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 13 the Court in 1931 found state
action in a systematic discrimination by tax assessors even though
the state court had held the acts to be unauthorized and thus not
14
the action of the state. And in 1945, in Screws v. United States,
the Court again held to the view that it is "immaterial that the state
officer exceeded the limits of his authority" in deciding whether
state action is involved. Since the officer "acts in the name and for
the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of
the State." Some language by Justice Rutledge in his concurring
opinion is of interest: "It is too late nov . . . to question that in
these matters abuse binds the state and is its act, when done by
one to whom it has given power to make the abuse effective to
achieve the forbidden ends. Vague ideas of dual federalism, of ultra
vires doctrine imported from private agency, do not nullify what
four years of civil strife and eighty years have verified."
Similarly, the concept of state action has been expanded to include the actions of any organ of the state. The racial covenant cases
provide apt illustration. Shelley v. Kraemere5 in 1948 involved a
racial restrictive covenant which had been invoked when the property in question was sold to a Negro. A decree of specific performance of the covenant was granted by a state court, and was challenged on the ground that such state court enforcement of a racial
covenant was, first, state action and, second, an invalid discrimination under the equal protection clause. While true that the discrimination had been started by private individuals, "but for the active
participation of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of
state power," the Negro would have been allowed to purchase and
occupy the land. The opinion by Chief Justice Vinson contained
the following language which is important to the present inquiry:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases
...the principle has become firmly imbedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.""'
112.
113.
114.
115.

Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288 (1913).
284 U.S. 239 (1931).
325 U.S.91,110 (1945).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).

116. Id. at 18.
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Shelley was followed by Barrows v. Jackson in 1953, a case in
which the Court said that the same principle applies to an action
for damages against a party who violates such a covenant by selling
the land to a Negro. In the course of its opinion, to which Chief
Justice Vinson strongly dissented, the Court said, "If a state court
awards damages for breach of a restrictive covenant, a prospective
seller of restricted land will either refuse to sell to non-Caucasians
or else will require non-Caucasians to pay a higher price to meet
the damages which the seller may incur. Solely because of their
race, non-Caucasians will be unable to purchase, own, and enjoy
property on the same terms as Caucasians. Denial of this right by
state action deprives such non-Caucasians, unidentified but identifiable, of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." So far as finding state action is concerned, the Court reasoned that "it becomes not [the seller's] voluntary choice, but the
State's choice that she observe her covenant or suffer damages.
The action of a state court at law to sanction the validity of the
restrictive covenant . . .would constitute state action as surely
as it was state action to enforce such covenants in equity, as in
Shelley.. ,;
When put together Shelley and Barrows seem to add up to the
proposition that racial discrimination is legal, i.e., not unlawful,
when done privately but that there is a stigma attached to it which
-makesit improper for a court to give official sanction to exercises
of this legal "right." This poses a neat jurisprudential question of
whether it is possible to have a right for which the possessor cannot
get judicial enforcement. In other words, does not the sum of
Shelley added to Barrows equal a judicial declaration of invalidity
of the racial covenant?" 81
A sequel to the racial covenant cases came in 1955 in the case of
CharlottePark and Recreation Cominit v. Barringer." It involved
the grant of land to a city to be used as a park for white people
only, with the provision that the land was to revert to the grantor
should it be used by others than whites. This provision the Supreme Court of North Carolina characterized as a fee simple determinable,- and reasoned that since it operated without the inter117. 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953). Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting, stated
that "these racial restrictive covenants, whatever we may think of them, are
not legal nullifies so far as any doctrine of federal law is concerned; it is not
unlawful to make them; it is not unlawful to enforce them unless the method
by which they are enforced in some way contravenes the Federal Constitution or a federal statute." Id. at 261.
118. Cf. Huber, Revolution it; Private Law?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 8 (1953).
119. 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955).
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vention of the state judicial machinery (it was "automatic" said
the court) no state action was involved so as to bring it within
the scope of the doctrine of the Shelley case. The United States
Supreme Court refused to review the decision. 120 Eventually, however, it will have to do so. Until that time, the technique of the
racial clause in a fee simple determinable would seem to be available for use by those who wish to avoid the impact of the racial
covenant cases.
2. Another Line of Development
The foregoing series of cases, which makes it clear that any
action of any official or organ of a state falls within the scope of the
state action concept, has not as yet been applied to situations where
there is a failure to act. The reach of the fourteenth amendment,
accordingly, is negative in that it serves to invalidate particular
improper action adjudged to be violative of due process or equal
protection standards. It has no affirmative thrust in that a state
has no constitutional duty to prevent "private" acts of discrimination, although the Barrows case may indicate a possible trend in
that direction. It takes action of a state, moreover, to trigger the
amendment. Nonaction, i.e., passive acquiescence in unofficial discrimination, has not been proscribed even though it is of course
protected by authority of state law and state power.""
Nevertheless, the clear trend of judicial decision is to bring more
and more activity within the reach of the limitations of the Constitution. Since the beginning of our national history, more and
more governments have been made subject to due process and
similar limitations. At the outset, only the federal government was
120. The case title was changed when it was considered by the United
States Supreme Court. Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n,
350 U.S. 983 (1956).
. 121. But see Pekelis, Law and Social Action 120-23 (1950), for an
argument that state inaction can be action under the Constitution. See also
Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political"and Economic Compulsion, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 149 (1935). In Comment, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 733
(1947), the following statement appears: "What is action by the state and
where it ceases is an interesting speculation in political philosophy. In a final
sense, state action permeates society, for the existence of anything and the
action of any individual or group is permitted, commanded or forbilden by
the state: it can fairly be said that everything in the social organism takes
character from its relation to the central collective purpose manifested by
the government. But a distinction is made in the common understanding between action by the state and the action of private persons and it is in terms
of this distinction that the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to speak.
Perhaps the only logical principle on which to found the distinction is to
attribute that action to the state which embodies a purpose of the government
or of one entrusted with its authority which is separable from the purposes
of private individuals."
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circumscribed by the Constitution (by the bill of rights). Then
the Civil War amendments (the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth) brought the states within that circumscription. Since 1865
judicial interpretation has extended the area to counties and cities
and other local sovereignties. True in the line of cases developed
above, it is equally true in the parallel line of development of the
concept of state action, one which might be termed the application
of the Constitution to "private governments."1 -" These cases involve situations in which an ostensibly private organization performs acts which are either of the type normally performed by government, or are of such overriding importance as to make those
acts, n the language of the California Supreme Court, "quasi3
public. 23
The voting cases (the so-called "white primary" cases) furnish
instructive guidance of the length to which the Supreme Court is
willing to extend the concept of state action when the activity in
question is considered to be of vital importance. These cases have
arisen and been decided under both the fourteenth amendment
and the fifteenth amendment. The latter reads in pertinent part
as follows: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Because
the principal problem under both amendments is whether state
action is involved, the cases will be considered as a group with the
label "white primary cases" being used generically.
Except for a brief period immediately after the Civil War a
practice of systematic exclusion of the Negro from the polls has
characterized the S6uth. It is only in recent years that any significant number of Negroes has gained the ballot, and even now that
number is pitifully small. Moreover, it is diminishing in some sec22
tions of the South.1
The period has been characterized by a series
of attempts by Negroes to gain full voting stature through the medium 'of Supreme Court invalidation of exclusion practices. The
122. "It seems to me that there is more than an a priori hypothesis to
support the notion that our generation of constitutional lawyers is discovering a new dimension in our federal structure-the dimension of private
governments." Pekelis, supra note 121, at 96.

123. James v. Marinship .Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).

124. While there is no doubt that over the years, there has been a
marked increase in the number of Negroes voting, at the same time in such

parts of the South as the so-called "black belt" the number has been de-

creasing since the Supreme Court's segregation decisions. See the article by
Hodding Carter, Racial Crisis in the Deep South, Saturday Evening Post,

December 17, 1955, p. 26; O'Connor, Negro Voter in the South, 29 Interracial
Rev. No. 1, p. 9 (Jan. 1956).
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techniques used to prevent voting by Negroes have included "grandfather" clauses, educational qualifications, registration requirements, and restrictions on membership in a political party. Only
125
the latter device concerns us here.

The decisional development has been fairly uniform and has
revealed a consistent trend toward the enfranchisement of the
Negro. A state statute which denied Negroes the right to vote in
party primary elections was held to be state action and a denial of
equal protection. 128 And when the Texas Legislature subsequently
tried to avoid the impact of that decision by forming an executive
committee to which it gave the power to decide on qualifications
for membership in the Democratic Party, the Court again struck
it down on the ground that the committee was an agency of the
state.12 7 The next attempt was to restrict membership

through

action of the state convention of the party. Here again, after first
failingto find state action,1 2 s the Court invalidated the restriction.

The reason given was that state statutes set out performance of
certain duties by party officials and made other official uses of the
party machinery. And in Smith v. Allwright, the Court stated, "The
party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed
upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political party." 1 9
Following that decision South Carolina repealed all statutory
provisions regarding primary elections and political parties. Nevertheless, a requirement of the Democratic Party that only white
persons could vote in primary elections was declared to be invalid
state action. 3 That decision, by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, found that the act of a political party was state
action "where the state law has made the primary an integral part
of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively
controls the choice." The political party, in other words, could not
be considered to be a private club. And in a federal district court
decision in 1948 a requirement of the Democratic Party of South
125. In 1939 Justice Frankfurter had this to say: "The IFifteenthl
Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right
to vote may remain unrestricted as to race." Lane v. Wilkon. 307 U.S 26,.
275 (1939).
126. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
127. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
128. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
219. 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).
130. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denird, 333
U.S. 875 (1948).

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Carolina that white as well as Negro qualified voters, before voting in the primary, take an oath that they will support separation
of the races was invalidated.1"' The final link came in 1953 in the
jaybird Primary Case, Terry v. Adams.132 Again, Texas provided
the arena for the conflict. This time an attempt to place the primary
one step further from the state was made. An organization calling
itself the Jaybird Association was formed. This organization controlled the designation of party nominees. Again, the Supreme
Court found state action, saying that "for a state to permit such a
duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of
those processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.
...
It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit within its borders the use of any device that
produces an equivalent of the prohibited election."133
A comparable development of the application of due process
and equal protection constitutional concepts to ostensibly private
organizations is revealed in another group of cases, Kerr v. Enoch
PrattFree Library,234 Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 35 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Toiw& Corp.,'
Marsh v. Alabama,"37 and Betts v. Easley.138 These cases pose squarely the problem of whether an organization traditionally and normally considered to be "private" can have sufficient "public" characteristics as
to make constitutional proscriptions apply to it. The five cases do
not, it should be mentioned, reach uniform results. They display
all of the conflicting considerations inherent in the state action
problem and all of the doubts raised in the minds of the judges
reaching the decisions. Since they afford the closest existing analogy to the inquiry of this section, they deserve exposition in some
detail.
Kerr involved a privately endowed library in Baltimore, controlled by a board of trustees appointed by the original donor, but
the operating funds of which came mostly from the city and state.
131. Brown y. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1948), aff'd, 174
F2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
132. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
133. Id. at 469. Justice Minton, dissenting, stated: "Does [the] failure
of the State to act to prevent individuals from doing what they have the right
as individuals to do amount to state action? I venture the opinion it does not."
Id. at 489.
134. 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
135. 78 F. Supp. 451 (D.Md. 1948).
136. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981
(1950).
137. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
138. 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
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Negroes had been barred from the training school for librarians
conducted by the library. This was held to be state action and, accordingly, an invalid discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. This case is particularly
noteworthy even though it was'not rendered by the United States
Supreme Court. It went beyond Smith v. Allwright and the other
voting cases in finding state action in an activity not strictly "governmental" in nature, one which, to use orthodox language, is "proprietary."1"9 It would be on Kerr and its rationale that any concerted attempt to breach the walls of private education would be
based. Hence, the following language of the court of appeals is
important: Quoting Nixon v. Condon, one of the voting cases, the
court said that "The test is not whether the members of the [activity] are the representatives of the state in the strict sense in which
an agent is the representative of his principal. The test is whether
they are to be classified as representatives of the state to such an
extent and in such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to their action. ' 1140 Of course it would require an extension, a major extension, of the Kerr case to breach the walls of
private education because there the court was careful to point out
the close financial connection which the library had with the city of
Baltimore and the fact that the city officials could and did exercise
control over the library. The Norris case, another arising in Baltimore, shows the importance of this factor. In that case, in an opinion noteworthy for its discussion of the judicial standards of judgment for distinguishing private from public institutions, the federal
district judge stated that "The legal test between a private and a
public corporation is whether the corporation is subject to control
by public authority, State or municipal."1 4
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation furnishes further instructive guidance, although that case was decided by only a fourto-three margin in the New York Court of Appeals, has since been
reversed by subsequent legislation and, hence, has little value as
precedent. Stuyvesant Town was a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. After entering into a contract with New York City under which the city condemned land
and granted a tax exemption, Stuyvesant Town was built in New
York City. Under the contract, the corporation agreed to adhere
to certain building standards, to permit city auditors to inspect the
139. The governmental-proprietary distinction is often used by judge%
to explain a result, particularly in cases involving municipal corporations.
140. 149 F.2d at 219.
141. 78 F. Supp. at 458.
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books; and to turn over to the city any cash surplus upon the dissolution of the corporation. Negroes sought to enjoin the corporation from leasing only to white persons, but the injunction was
denied. On appeal, the four majority judges of the New York court
admitted that the federal courts had held "private groups subject
to the constitutional restraints when they perform functions of a
governmental character in matters of great public importance."
Nevertheless, they sought to distinguish the Marsh case (discussed
below) on the ground that "the state has lent its power in support
of the actions of private individuals or corporations, and in so doing
has clothed the private act with the character of state action."
Recognizing that the concept of state action is an expanding
one, the four judges still felt that it had been found in the past
"only in cases where the state has consciously exerted its power in
aid of discrimination or where private individuals have acted in a
governmental capacity so recognized by the state." It was then said
that if state action were to be found in the circumstances of the
case it would come "perilously close to asserting that any State
assistance to an organization which discriminates necessarily violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Tax exemption and the power
of eminent domain are freely given to many organizations which
necessarily limit their benefits to a restricted group. It has not yet
been held that the recipients are subject to the restraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
The three dissenting judges vigorously maintained that "even
the conduct of private individuals offends against the [equal protection clause] if it appears in an activity of public importance and
if the state has accorded the transaction either the panoply of its
authority or the weight of its power, interest and support."14 This language can be compared to that of the United States
Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama, the so-called "company
town" case. The town 6f Chickasaw, Alabama, was wholly owned
by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, which had built the streets,
sidewalks and other public necessities and had maintained a privately organized and paid police and fire department system. Chickasaw looked like any other small American town. Plaintiff, a mem142. 299 N.Y. at 542. Flack, Adoption of the fourteenth amendment
262-63 (1908), suggests that individual action was included in state action,
or so many believed at the time the fourteenth amendment became a part of
the Constitution. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26, 57-59 (1883). In Hale, Force and the Stlate,
op. cit. supra note 121, it is argued that an omission by a state to enforce or
secure the equal rights designed to be protected by the fourteenth amendment is state action. According to Hale, a state which omits to secure rights,
denies them.
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ber of Jehovah's Witnesses, was arrested after she refused to leave
the town when ordered to do so by company officials. She was convicted under an Alabama statute which makes it a crime to remain
on the property of another after being warned to leave. The conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, on religious freedom grounds. "The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general," the Court
said, "the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it."
This appears to be an explicit recognition of the notion that the
Constitution can be applied to private agencies. "Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town," the Court
went on to say, "the public . . . has an identical interest in the

functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of
communication remain free. .

.

. The managers [of Chickasaw]

appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and
religion . . . consistently with the purposes of the constitutional

guarantees." Although not stated expressly this is tantamount to
the Court saying that the fourteenth amendment limited the powers
of the corporation owning the town, an admittedly private organization which received no help from and had no connection with the
state !
The other organizations which are usually called private but
which have had constitutional limitations applied to them are labor
unions. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.

4

8

foreshadowed the

development. In that case the United States Supreme Court remarked that if the Railway Labor Act conferred an exclusive bargaining power on a union "without any commensurate statutory
duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. For the
representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature
which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny.
restrict, destroy, or discriminate against the rights of those for
whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights." The Court refused to
rule on this constitutional question, choosing instead to base its decision on a question of statutory interpretation, but Justice Murphy
had the following to say in a concurring opinion: "While such a
union is essentially a private organization, its power to represent
and bind all members of a class or craft is derived solely from Con143. 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). An important extension of this came in
1956 in the case of Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892
(1956) (doctrine of Steele case extended to unions certified under TaftHartley Act).

19571

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

gress. The Act contains no language which directs the manner in
which the bargaining representative shall perform its duties. But
it cannot be assumed that Congress meant to authorize the representative to act so as to ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise the Act would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amendment in this respect."
Betts v. Easley, a Kansas case, is a direct holding to that effect.
There, a labor union designated under the Railway Labor Act as
collective bargaining agent for all of the workmen involved, excluded Negro workmen from full participation in the privileges
available to others. Negroes were admitted only in a separate, allied organization which was to be "under the jurisdiction of and
represented by the delegation of the nearest white local." The Supreme Court of Kansas held that this violated the fifth amendment's due process clause, the court saying that the union could
not be regarded as a "private association of individuals free from
the constitutional and statutory restraints which attach to public
agencies."'"
The United States Supreme Court, in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard,4 5 in like fashion has recognized that labor
unions at times hiave a public character. Other state courts have
followed suit. For example, in 1944 the California Supreme Court
in a case involving a closed shop said that, "Where a union has
... attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed
shop agreements and other forms of collective labor action, such
a union occupies a quasipublic position similar to that of a public
service business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It
may no longer claim the same freedom from legal restraints enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal associations. Its asserted right to
choose its own members does not merely relate to social relations;
48
it affects the fundamental right to work for a living."'
B. An Appraisal and Evaluation
Judicial construction of the constitutional concept of state action
has been discussed in some detail because the concept is particular144. The Betts case is one of several which together add up to the

proposition that the limitations of the federal Constitution may, at times, run

against individuals. See note 146 infra.
145. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).

146. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 CaL2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335

(1944). Cf. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (1954). In Note,
54 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 570 (1956), it is asserted that the results of the Syres
case, supra note 143, supports "the view that a federally certified union is, in
effect, a quasi-governmental agency, the actions of which are subject to the

limitations of the fifth amendment."

MIINNESOT.A LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:245

ly important at this juncture of our national history. We are in the
midst of an era when the Negro, long under the stigma of secondclass citizenship or worse, is making determined efforts to improve
his over-all status. This assault on historical patterns of discrimination has been in serious operation only twenty years or so. During that time tremendous gains have been made, so much so that
there is no doubt that official acts of discrimination, if not already
outlawed, will be eliminated and that the Negro will have full status
as far as the activities and pronouncements of formal governmental
authority are concerned. But it is unlikely that he will be satisfied
with mere formal equality of treatment, unless that equality is also
true of the operational activities of the important societal institutions, educational, for one, and what is perhaps more important,
opportunity to work and earn a better living, for another.
In order to accomplish this expanded goal the Negro would
have an easier legal row to hoe if he used legislation, as distinguished from judicial action.147 But of course legislation designed
to equalize the status of Negro to white would be impossible of
enactment in at least the South, if not much of the rest of the nation.
Hence, judicial action would be the only feasible avenue to follow.
To be successful, that action would have to be designed to get Supreme Court acquiescence in an even more expanded concept of
state action than those accepted in the past. The argument, if and
when made, would run like this: the restrictive covenant, white
primary, company town, and closed shop cases have shown that
ostensible private action must yield to an expanded concept of state
action when important public functions are being performed; the
Supreme Court in the Segregation Cases found an important national interest in education, in other words, indicated that education was an important public function; there is some state governmental subsidy of private (particularly denominational) education
in the form of the granting of tax exemptions, free textbooks and
bus transportation and similar subventions; therefore, so the argument would go, the constitutional prohibitions should be held to
apply to all education, whether public or nonpublic.
What would be the reaction of the Supreme Court to such an
argument? First, under present doctrine the Court would doubtless refuse to accept it. The reasons for this are multiple. For one
thing, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court wishes
to carry the doctrine of the Segregation Cases to its logical extreme.
147. Cf. Berger, Equality by Statute (1952) ; Ruchames, Race, Jobs,

and Politics (1953).
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It is fallacious to think that any principle will be projected to its
logical conclusion. To think so is to express a "fear, by no means
uncommon, that judges are somehow compelled by a sort of iron
logical compulsion, to proceed from one conclusion to all others
which might seem analgous by any syllogistic extravagance. That
no such compulsion exists is the peculiar virtue of the commonlaw tradition.'11 4 The law itself can be viewed as a group of concepts which have been stopped short of ultimate extreme. Much

of law, as in all of politics, is a balancing of diverse interests. It is
seldom indeed that any concept is of such overriding importance
that it will be carried out without regard for countervailing interests. This is particularly true of the "great generalities" of the Constitution. The point is that there is no inherent dynamism which
would make the principle of nondiscrimination encompass all education, both public and private.
Furthermore, the cases which have found judicial expansion
of the concept of state action are distinguishable in part. In most
if not all of them the activity in question is not only important
(i.e., "governmental" or "fundamental" or whatever other label
may be placed upon it) to society (i.e., voting, earning a living,
community life) but there is in each instance no available, acceptable alternative or substitute. In education, on the other hand,
private education is of course counterbalanced and overshadowed
by public education. Desegregation in public education presumably
being a fact, an acceptable alternative is available. The reasonable
educational goals of the Negro thus are fulfilled by integrated public education plus that part of private education which voluntarily
desegregates. Thus, finding state action to be involved in private
education would tip the scales too much in the other direction.
In addition, extending the concept of state action to true private
education would tend to jeopardize all types of private group activity. Only the most compelling reasons would lead the Court to open
that "Pandora's box." And much of the virtues of private education are existent because it is private and not controlled, except
in a tenuous manner, by the state. There are values to be preserved,
both individual and societal, by a continuation of the present system
of education. Finally, it may be said that the well-known reluctance
of the Supreme Court to rule on constitutional questions would tend
to make it postpone a decision on the question, should it arise, as
long as possible.
148. Sutherland, The Supreme Court and Prfvate Schools, 25 Harv.
Educ. Rev. 127, 128 (1955).
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In sum, it can be stated that there is little or no chance of a
successful assault from without on the doors of true private education in the foreseeable future. The "private school" plans of some
Southern states, enacted in an attempt to avoid the impact of the
Court's decision, are quite another matter. It is probable that they
will generally be invalidated judicially when (and if) they are
challenged.
C. Addendum
Before leaving this subject, it should be noted that state legislation designed to open the doors of private education to all, to
impose standards of nondiscrimination in admission, would doubtless be upheld under an attack on federal constitutional grounds.
Some Northern states, notably New York, in fact have such statutes. They have met no serious challenge. And the possibility of
arguing that imposed admission standards would be an interference
with religious freedom would doubtless also fail. The principle
which upholds state prescription of standards for parochial school
education is easily broad enough to include admission practices."'
V. Limitations in Grants and Gifts
One result of the strong preference in American law for the
institution of private property has been the fact that a property
owner is allowed to control its use, not only during his lifetime,
but also long after his death. Liberty of testation has been the rule,
although there have been some limitations imposed in every state.
These, however, do not alter the basic proposition of control by
the "dead hand."' 50 In any civilized society, there is no escape
from the dead hand. In a sense we live by it. Our literature, our
art, our architecture, our science, our religion, all are built upon
the achievements of dead men."'' As much can be said of private
education. To a large extent its livelihood, its economic viability.
is dependent upon the income derived from gifts and endowments
from men long dead. Even when the gifts are made inter vivos
usually they last until after his death. The fact that those who
endow universities and other private schools often attach special
conditions to their gifts gives rise to another set of legal problems
with respect to racial discrimination and private education.
Dead hand control can and does create two general problem
areas for the private school administrator in the context of the
149. See Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1950).
150. See Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand c. 1 (1955).
151. Id. at 140.
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present inquiry. First, it may be that some of the endowment funds
or other assets of the school have been granted with the provision
that the'beneficial use is limited to "whites" or "Caucasians." This
problem is neatly posed by litigation now before the state courts of
Pennsylvania, involving famed Girard College in Philadelphia.
Second, the possibility exists that grants of land may have been
made to a school on condition that the land would revert to the
grantor or his heirs should it ever be used for Negroes or other nonwhites. Another recent case, CharlotteParkand Recreation Comim'n
152
v. Barriger,
a North Carolina case, illustrates this problem.
It is evident that both of these problems involve essentially the
same question. However, there is enough difference in them to make
separate discussion advisable. But some general statements, germane to both areas, should precede the particularized development.
First, it is of the essence of the power of an owner over his
property that he may limit the beneficial use of it as narrowly as
he wishes. Thus, he may create a trust in his will and limit the beneficiaries under the trust to as small a group of people as he desires, and he may grant property to another on condition that it
be used for certain purposes only, and if it is not so used that it
revert to the grantor or his heirs. Even when explicit provision
is made for the exclusion of certain racial groups, e.g., the Negroes,
from the beneficial use of trust funds or of property, the restrictions
are not invalid per se."S
Next, attacks on the types of private discrimination involved
in the exclusion of racial groups from the beneficial use of trust
funds or property have thus far centered around attempts to find
some tie to official government action in order to get the requisite
"state action" necessary to trigger the fourteenth amendment.
No frontal assault has yet been made on the limitations themselves
as being invalid per se. Thus, in the Girard College litigation, the
argument was made that the trust is administered by an official
body, the Philadelphia Board of Directors of City Trusts, and that
this is sufficient connection to government to constitute state action.
And in the Charlotte Park case, the attempt was made to establish
the proposition that operation of the clause under which the granted
property reverted to the grantor was state action within the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer (discussed in section IAV).
152. 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955). The Supreme Court refused
to review the decision. Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n,
350 U.S. 983 (1956).
153. See, generally, 3 Scott, Trusts c. 11 (1939).
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Third, it may be possible to suggest methods of attacking the
restrictive clauses directly. There may, in other words, be chinks
in the doctrine of freedom of testation as far as racial limitations
are concerned. There are a few judicial statements leaning toward
this end. These may be harbingers of the things to come. In other
words, it is possible, albeit improbable, that the racial restrictive
clause will be outlawed entirely from deeds and grants of property.
Finally, both problem areas raise two questions: (1) May one
excluded from the benefits of a trust because of race bring an action
to have the trust opened up to include him? and (2) May the
trustees of such a trust (or the grantees under a grant of property)
refuse to carry out its terms; that is to say, may they ignore the
racial restrictions, and when brought to account in court plead that
enforcement of the restriction is precluded by the Shelley v. Kracmer doctrine?
Since our attention is focused on private education, we will
limit the present discussion to the relevant aspects of charitable
trusts for educational purposes and to grants of land or other property to private schools. (The Girardcase involves a charitable trust,
but the Charlotte Park case dealt with the grant of land to a city.)
A charitable trust, it should be noted, differs from the ordinary
private trust in that it need not have a definite beneficiary and may
be created to exist in perpetuity. Private trusts usually must have
15 4
a definite beneficiary and cannot be so created as to exist forever.
A. The Girard College Litigation15
Under the terms of a trust created in 1831 by Stephen Girard
for the education of "poor white male orphans," Girard College
was established in Philadelphia. The school is administered by the
Board of Directors of City (of Philadelphia) Trusts, the trustee,
in accordance with a state statute. The Board consists of the Mayor
and President of the City Council, both ex-officio, and twelve other
members appointed by judges of the courts of common pleas of
the county. Its operations are conducted autonomously, free from
any control of the city or state, save for the jurisdiction of the
154. Simes, op. cit. supra note 150, c. 5, has a good brief discussion of
this. See Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1920).
155. In re Estate of Stephen Girard, 24 U.S.L. Week 1021, 2068 (PhilaCounty, Pa., Orphans Ct. Jan. 6, 1956), 25 U.S.L. Week 2215 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 11, 1956) (affirming, 24 U.S.L. Week 2311); N.Y. Times, Nov. 13.
1956, p. 33. This litigation has engendered considerable interest. Discussions
may be found in Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 182 (1956) : Gordon,
The Girard College Case: Desegregation and a Municipal Trust, 304 Annals
53 (March, 1956) ; Notes, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 285 (1956), 104 U.Pa.L. Rev.
547 (1956).
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Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, to oversee the trust administration.
The Girard trust is today worth some $95 million, the income from
which goes for the most part to the support of Girard College.
Negro orphans, otherwise fully qualified (being poor and male),
applied for admission to the school but were rejected by the trustees
because of their race. They then petitioned the Orphans' Court for
a determination that they were eligible for admission to the school,
arguing (1) that the terms of the trust should be conformed to present-day conditions, (2) that racial discrimination was against public
policy, and" (3) that administration of the trust by a city-appointed
board constituted state action which was invalid under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In a comprehensive opinion, Judge Bolger of the Orphans' Court rejected these
arguments and upheld the trust in accordance with its terms. Affirmed by the entire Orphans' Court sitting en banc, and again affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, one justice dissenting, it will probably be carried to the United States Supreme Court
in an attempt to get the constitutional question settled.
On the merits, the case stands neatly poised in the hazy area
separating private from official action, in an area which affords
full opportunity for judicial craftsmanship. The decision could have
gone either way in the Orphans' Court, for the close connection
of the trust and the trustees could easily have brought it within
the ambit of state action. The reason given for not finding state
action was that the activity of the city was "proprietary" not "governmental" in nature. That comes close to saying that if a city acts
like a private individual, then it becomes in law a private individual, and loses the character of a governmental entity. Just how
this metamorphosis is supposed to take place was left unstated by
the judges of the Orphans' Court. Also left unstated was any justification for a distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions in the field of constitutional interpretation.,1 0 In sum,
it would seem to be not unlikely that the decision will be overruled.
However, although the tie to the state is close enough to find state
action, still the policy considerations which may have motivated the
Supreme Court in such a case as Terry v. Adams (the jaybird
Primary Case) 157 are not present in the Girard case. The deprivation involved at Girard College is not nearly so significant or so
156. Cf. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.WV.a. 194p)
(equal protection clause held to apply to municipal corporation in exercise
of proprietary function).
157. This case was discussed in section IV.
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great as the instances when a Negro is kept from voting or from
obtaining a job. Readily available is desegregated public education.
And making a compelling argument leading to the desegregation
of all private schools is far different from making one for the integration of a private school.
Be that as it may, whether the Girard trust does or does not
involve state action is of less interest to a private school administrator than the attempt made to outlaw the racial clause as being
contrary to public policy. Another facet of interest and importance
is the attempted application of the doctrine of cy pres to the trust.
These two aspects of the Girard College case bear development in
some detail.
The position of the Negro applicant as far as public policy and
the racial restrictive clause was concerned was that the clause conflicted with the present public policy of the City of Philadelphia,
the State of Pennsylvania and the United States. The argument
was based on a series of statutes and municipal ordinances dealing
with racial matters and uniformly indicating that the official statements of the three governments pointed ineluctably toward a policy
of nondiscrimination.s' As far as the policy of the United States
was concerned, recent cases dealing with racial segregation, the
Charter of the United Nations, and various pronouncements of
the President, in addition to the platforms of the two principal political parties, were all offered as establishing a national policy
against racial discrimination. Both City of Philadelphia officials and
the Attorney General of Pennsylvania filed briefs in support not
only of the Negroes' applications but also on the specific point that
the racial clause violates the present public policy of the city and
state.
Neither the hearing judge (Judge Bolger) nor the full bench
of the Orphans' Court, in reaching their separate but identical decisions, dealt with this argument. 1 This failure to act is entirely
understandable, for the public policy argument leaves the court with
a most difficult choice. Either it could say that the public policy
of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania and the United States was in
favor of, or indifferent to, racial discrimination (scarcely possible
158. Brief for Exceptants William Ashe Foust and Robert Felder, In
Re Estate of Stephen Girard, pp. 33-41 (1955).
159. The only mention is in Judge Bolger's opinion, where he stated,
after setting out the argument of the petitioners, that "having construed the
applicable constitutional provisions, the pertinent acts of assembly and court
decisions, [it is decided] that the operation of this trust does not offend
public policy as so determined." I Race Relations L. Rep. 325, 338 (1956).
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today), or it could say that the public policy was against racial
discrimination and in so doing, not only open Girard College to
Negro orphans, but also strike a body blow at all types of private
acts of discrimination. A third choice, that of calling the argument
irrelevant, was also theoretically available; however, it was scarcely
tenable. The Orphans' Court chose, rather, to ignore the argument
and base the decision on a finding that the trust was valid and that
no state action was involved.
The question is thus left dangling, though ripe for decision.
How long such a decision can be postponed is, of course, unknown.
However, it can be said that the law seems to be moving in the
direction of the creation of a public policy making racial discriminations invalid per se. Not only may the various statutes of many
states as well as the federal government be pointed to, but there
also exist treaties, including the UN Charter, which serve to buttress the point, and executive orders of President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Roosevelt. 10 0 As far as the judiciary is concerned, the decisions are indeed scant which would serve
to establish the policy. Some scattered opinions do exist. For example, in Hurd v. Hodge 01' in which the Supreme Court refused
to enforce a restrictive covenant in the District of Columbia, the
Court said that

".....

even in the absence of the statute, there are

other considerations which would indicate that enforcement of restrictive covenants . . . is judicial action contrary to the public
policy of the United States. . . . The power of the federal courts

to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised
subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of
the United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable legal precedents." The California Supreme Court in 1944 stated that there was "a public policy against
racial discrimination . . . [and] that a statute [was unnecessary]

to enforce such a policy where private rather than public action is
involved."' 16 And in Clifton V. Puete,163 the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals in 1949 invalidated a racial restrictive covenant. A Canadian case, Re Drummond Wren,2'0 is a direct holding to the ef160. The executive orders establishing the Fair Employment Practices
Commission and its successors is an example. See Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and
Politics (1953), for an account of the history of the FEPC.
161. 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948).
162. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal2d 721, 740, 155 P.2d 329, 339

(1944).

163. 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
164. [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674. The Wren case may, however, ive been
overruled or its effect %itiated.See Comment, 29 Can. B. Rev. 969 (1951).
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fect that a racial restrictive covenant is void for the reason that it
is contrary to public policy.
The point to all of this, as far as our present inquiry is concerned, is that the clear import of recent occurrences throughout
the United States (and the world) is that even private acts of
racial discrimination are wrongful and that they cannot be sanctioned by law. Whether this will mean an eventual decision which
would overrule the Philadelphia Orphans' Court in the Girard case
is impossible to tell. Nevertheless, it does have importance to the
trustee of any charitable trust which may confine its benefits to
certain racial groups. And it has importance to the administrators
of those private schools which are beneficiaries of charitable trusts.
1. The Doctrine of Cy Pres
A final argument advanced by the Negro applicants in the
Girard case involved the attempted application of the equitable
doctrine of cy pres to the case. The argument was stated in the
following manner. The changed circumstances in public policy,
constitutional law, education, and social sciences and human relations prevent Stephen Girard's educational objectives from being
achieved if the racial restriction is continued. Both the hearing
judge and the full Orphans' Court rejected this, the full court saying that "there is ... no present failure of the purpose of the trust:
a fortiori, there is no ground for application of the cy pres doc165
trine."
Cy pres is a doctrine applied generally by courts of equity to
save a trust from dissolution in those cases when the precise intention of the settlor cannot be carried out. When allowed, the trust is
continued in operation "as near as possible" to the settlor's intention. The definition given by the Restatement of Trusts is frequently quoted: "If property is given in trust to be applied to a
particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or
impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and
if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the
property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court
will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor." 166 While there is no single uniformly recognized definition
of the doctrine, it has been stated that all "would probably agree
165. Estate of Stephen Girard, 1 Race Relations L. Rep. 340, 342
(1956).
166.

Restatement, Trusts § 399 (1935). See Scott, Trusts § 399 (1939).
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that the value of the rule lies in its ability to provide the flexibility
or long-lasting gifts to the exnecessary to accommodate perpetual
1 67
igencies of new conditions."'
As far as established doctrine is concerned, the decision in the
Girard case seems to be in accord with the holdings of most courts,
although there have been no precisely similar factual situations litigated heretofore. 6 s The case turns on the definition to be given
to the word "impracticable" in the Restatement version of the cy
pres doctrine. Certainly the Girard trust has neither become impossible nor illegal.169 Now of course what is or is not impracticable
is a question not susceptible of solution by mathematical formula.
The answer will vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.
The novel factual situation in the Girard case gives the judiciary
an opportunity to extend the cy pres doctrine. Should a new twist
to that doctrine be created?
Varying answers will, of course, be given to a question such
as that. On the one hand, there is the position of the Orphans' Court
that application of the cy pres doctrine "would not only subvert
the purpose of [Girard's] will, but would threaten, if not destroy,
the entire structure of the law of wills in Pennsylvania."" This
may be called the argument by logical extension to horrendous
possibility. It is based on the assumption that there are no restraints
whatever on the disposition of property by will. As the Orphans'
Court went on to say, "Jus disponendi is still cardinal and basic
law." But of course there are limits on the power of testameritary
disposition, and the true question is not as stated by the Orphans'
Court but, rather, whether this is an appropriate time to engraft
another limitation on the power of the dead hand to control present
167. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States 2 (1950).
supra note 167, passim.
168. See Fisch, op. cit.
169. - Comment m of section 399 of the Restatement of Trusts states:

If it is possible and practicable and legal to carry out the particular purpose designated by the settlor, the doctrine of cy pres is
not applicable. In such case the court will compel the trustees to
carry out the particular purpose even though in the opinion of the
court a more useful disposition of the property might be made.
Thus, if a testator bequeaths a sum of money for the establishment and maintenance of a school of engineering the court will not
permit the application of the money to the erection and maintenance
of a school of agriculture, merely because it appears that a school of
agriculture would be more useful to the community.
On the other hand, the doctrine of cy pres is applicable even
though it is possible to carry out the particular purpose of the settlor.

if to carry it out would fail to accomplish the general charitable
intention of the settlor. In such a case it is 'impracticable' to carry out
the particular purpose, in the broad sense in which that word is used
in this Section. This is particularly likely to be the case where there
has been a change of circumstances after the creation of the trust

170. 1 Race Relations L. Rep. 340, 341 (1956).
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use of property. As-Justice Frankfurter pointed out in another context, it serves no useful purpose in the decision of cases by "conjuring up horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world."
There is, in other words, no reason to think that modifying Girard's will today would result in the destruction of the entire structure of the law of wills.
On the other hand, it is argued that the exigencies of mid-20th
century America make it incumbent that policy of racial nondiscrimination be adhered to at least officially, that the effects of discrimination are so invidious as to harm both those who are its object
and those who impose it, and that the general purposes of Girard's
trust cannot be carried out in an institution which practices racial
exclusion. Implicit in this argument is the view that all types of
racial discrimination, both public and private, are improper per
se, and the notion that traditional doctrines of private property
must give way when a sufficient social reason exists. When viewed
in this light, it can then be said that the Girard case does have
implications beyond the immediate issue before the court. Modifying Girard's will through the requested use of cy pres would make
a major change in law.
The question, in essence, is really one of policy-what is good
social policy in the middle of the twentieth century-and not one
of technical legal doctrine. For no matter how much a decision is
cloaked in legal language showing ostensible adherence to longestablished precedent, the decision is in final analysis based on notions of what is good policy. Holmes said it many years ago: "The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed."'1 71 The point is, it would appear,
that the cy pres doctrine is available for use by a judge in the Girard type of situation should he, for whatever reason, decide that
the time was ripe for it.
Little or nothing exists as authority to help the judge in this
decision. Perhaps some of the language of the Restatement of Trusts
could be used, language which suggests that a broad interpretation
be given to the "impracticability" test for cy pres.' 2 There is one
171. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).

172. See Restatement, Trusts §§ 381, 399 (1935). See also 3 Scott,
Trusts § 399 (1939).
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English case, In Re Dominion Students Hall Trusty,' which
might be used since it bears striking similarity to the Girard factual
situation. In that case, the court had under consideration a trust
originally restricted to dominion students of "European origin."
A petition was filed to eliminate the color restriction. This was
done, the court giving a narrow definition to the "impossibility"
requirement of cy pres and a broad definition to "impracticability."
It found that the general purpose of the charity, promoting community of citizenship, culture and tradition among all members of
the British Commonwealth, far from being furthered by the color
restriction, might in light of the changed times be defeated by cre74
ating antagonisms.1
If the decision in Girard is ultimately one of policy, then we
can go a step farther and say that in final analysis the policy argument becomes one of deciding how much credence to give to the
opinion of social scientists and others on the socio-psychological
effect of patterns of discrimination. It is widely felt, probably erroneously, that the opinions of social scientists had persuasive effect in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Segregation
Cases.'-5 Whether they did or not, it is worth noting that another
attempt was made in the Girard litigation to use sociological and
psychological data in an effort to prove that racial segregation had
a deleterious effect, not on the Negroes excluded from attendance
at Girard College, but on the white students there who were being
deprived of the opportunity to mix with colored colleagues.
The argument ran as follows: Girard's will calls for the establishment of an institution to provide "for such a number of poor
male white orphan children, as can be trained in one institution,
a better education ... than they usually receive from the application of public funds"; that they be taught "by every proper means
a pure attachment to our republican institutions"; that they have
instilled into their minds "the purest principles of morality so that
173. [1947] 1 Ch. 183.
174. Judge Bolger, the hearing judge, discussed the English case in the
following manner: "There a trust established and maintained by several
contributors was restricted to dominion students 'of European origin.' The
court eliminated a racial restriction because the retention of it would have
caused a failure of the main purpose of the trust which was to benefit the
empire. However, the change was made upon application by or with the

approval of the contributors; the court pointing out that had the trust been

established under a will, its power to make the change would have been at
least doubtful." 1 Race Relations L. Rep. 325, 339 (1956).
175. Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 150 (1955); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 182 (1956); Greenberg, Social Scientists Take
the Stand: A Review and Appraisal of Their Testimony inLiliqalion, 54
Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1956).
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on their entrance into active life, they may, from inclination and
habit, evince benevolence towards their fellow creatures ....
"
Testimony of several social scientists, a sociologist, an educatorpsychologist, and a psychologist was introduced. They were unanimously of the opinion that the experience of living in a segregated
institutional community creates serious conflicts in the mind of the
young student who is taught one thing and lives another. This testimony was counteracted by testimony of officers and former students
of Girard College, who were of the opinion that no such deleterious
effects resulted from racial exclusion.
The conflict in testimony was resolved by both the hearing judge
and the full Orphans' Court on review by summarily dismissing
the argument as irrelevant. "This testimony," the full court said,
"does not affect the legal principles here involved." 170
The enormously important question of what use should be made
of socio-psychological data in the judicial decision-making process
is one which is beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is, however,
suggested that the manner in which the court handled that testimony was eminently correct. There are at least two reasons for
this. First of all, present-day social science is far from being "scientific." Its propositions are based on what often is at best incon17
clusive evidence and are nothing more than tentative hypotheses. 1
Secondly, even if the "scientific" propositions of our social scientists are verifiable and have validity, it is questionable that they
have relevance. Moreover, it is doubtful that they should be used
for more than the limited purpose of indicating a factual basis for
legislation. That was what the so-called "Brandeis Brief" sought
to do: provide nonlegal data to indicate that legislative action was
reasonable. But to use nonlegal data, the testimony of sociologists
and psychologists and the like, for the purpose of overturning legislative action or declaring patterns of racial discrimination unconstitutional is quite another matter. Expert testimony of any type
no doubt at times has value, but if we are not to turn law courts
into forums for balancing the conflicting claims of various kinds of
experts, then we should be extremely careful about admitting such
testimony, and, if it is admitted into evidence, we should be ex176. 1 Race Relations L. Rep. 340, 342 (1956).
177. See Cabn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 150 (1955) ; Calh.
Jurisprudence,31 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 182 (1956) ; Judge Jerome Frank's contribution to the symposium entitled The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society: Ai
Round Table, 4 J. Pub. L. 1, 8 (1955). But see, for a statement of the usefulness of social science data in judicial decision-making. Greenberg, Social
Scientists Take the Stand. 54 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1956).
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tremely careful to insure that it is not given overriding importance.
At best, it would be but one factor among the many which any judge
must consider in reaching a judicial decision.'"
2. An Appraisal and a Question
The Girard case has important implications for the private
school administrator. It may provide the springboard for an assault
on the legal validity of racial restrictive clauses. For those institutions which have funds so earmarked this would be particularly
important. For all private institutions, denominational or otherwise,
it could mean the beginning of an attempt to remove racial barriers
to admission. Finally, there is a question left unasked in the discussion of the case which is important and which should be raised.
Suppose a trustee or school administrator decided not to await
such possible developments. Suppose that, in direct violation of
the terms of a trust or other grant of funds, it is decided to make
the beneficial use of the funds available to Negroes. What would be
the result?
The question is not easily answered. On the one hand, it is
obvious that a trustee of trust funds who violates the terms of the
trust may be removed and otherwise disciplined by the judiciary.11 0
But that would mean the intervention of the state and resultant
state action in what would, in essence, be the enforcement of a racial
restriction. Under the Supreme Court decisions in Shelley v. Kracmer and Barrows v. Jackson (discussed in section IV) judicial
enforcement of a racial clause is a denial of equal protection of the
laws and thus unconstitutional. Does this mean that a trustee may
safely ignore a racial restrictive clause?
178. Despite the oft-repeated statement to the contrary, facts do not
"speak for themselves." Still necessary, no matter how voluminous the accumulation of factual data may be, is a judgment upon those facts, a mental
effort which cannot be escaped. There is, in the context of race relations,
little or no dispute over the facts of discrimination or, to use the language
of Chief Justice Warren, of "a feeling of inferiority" which segregation
engenders. The lack of agreement is on what judgment should be placed on
those facts, an entirely different matter, or what the legal result of those
facts should be, still different This act of judgment is a profound, complex
matter. Those who propose the use of social science data in racial cases presuppose the judgment to be rendered.
Furthermore, facts are not -the easily ascertainable creatures they are
usually considered to be. Rather, just what the facts of any given situation
may be is an inquiry which at best is fraught with uncertainty. We assume,
for example, that a jury finds the facts in a trial, but that is scarcely true.
At best, the jury finds what it considers to be the facts and it is obvious that
its view of the facts may be widely at variance with wlmt actually took place.
Cf. Frank, Courts on Trial 211-12 (1949) ; Easton, Shiftizg Images of Social
Science and Values, 15 Antioch Rev. 3 (1955).
179. See, e.g., 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 527 (1946).
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The question asks too much for answer here. It will have to
suffice merely to raise it and to forego attempting an extended discussion. One thing, however, is clear and should be mentioned.
The recent court decisions on racial matters, when added to other
official pronouncements in the area, have importance beyond the
immediate context in which they are made. There is no doubt that
they will have important effects in many areas of what has traditionally been called "private law," including the law of contracts,
of trusts, and of property.'
B. The Barringer's' Case
In 1955 the North Carolina Supreme Court rendered a decision
which has importance to our present inquiry. The case was Charlotte Park & Recreation Conr'n v. Barringer,involving the question of a grant of property with the provision that the beneficial use
of the property should be limited to members of the white race. The
facts are that in 1929 Barringer conveyed land to a public corporation in Charlotte, North Carolina, for use as a municipal park, with
the limitation that "in the event that the said land . . . shall not

be kept, used and maintained for park, playground, and/or recreational purposes, for use by the white race only, and if such disuse or nonmaintenance continue for any period as long as one year,
S..

then .

.

. the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple

to the [grantor]."
The North Carolina court construed this limitation to be a
valid fee simple determinable which would revert automatically.
without the intervention of the state judiciary, should Negroes use
the land. "The determinable fee . . . automatically will cease and

terminate by its own limitation expressed in the deed, and the estate
granted automatically will revert [to the grantor], by virtue of the
limitation in the deed." Shelley v. Kraemer, the restrictive covenant
case. was held to have no application.
As with the Girard case, so it is that the Barringer case has
relevance and importance to our inquiry. The technicalities of
property law need not overly concern us. Whether the court was
technically accurate in terming the racial clause a fee simple determinable may be of interest to property lawyers, but is not germane here. There is no doubt that a clause which would operate
180. Cf. Huber, Revolution in Private Law?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 8 (1953).

181. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C.

311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955). Of the several comments on this case in legal
periodicals, see especially Note. 34 N.C.L. Rev. 113 (1955).
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automatically could easily be drafted by anyone knowledgable in
the field.
Agree with the North Carolina court or not, it stands as law
in that state, for the United States Supreme Court has refused to
review the decision..1 82 Even so, there are some important questions
left dangling by the North Carolina court. For instance, why wasn't
the racial condition void as being contrary to law and public policy?
And since the title to the land reverted to the grantor "by operation
of law," that is, by operation of the common law of North Carolina,
why isn't that state action within the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer?
Finally, assuming that a grantee would refuse to give up possession
of the property, would an action of ejectment by the grantor involve
invalid state action?
It would have done no violence to widely accepted legal doctrine
had the North Carolina court declared the condition void and refused to enforce it. A limitation of an estate conveyel is often considered to be invalid and unenforceable if it is contrary to law or
established public policy. An illustration is the case of Trustes
83
of Eureka College v. Bondurant,1
involving a conveyance of land
to a college on condition that the land would revert to the grantor
if the receipts therefrom were not used in a certain manner. The
Illinois Supreme Court found that the condition was in conflict with
a provision in the college charter and held the condition void. In
the Barrihgercase, the conduct required by the grantee of the land
to carry out the condition is unlawful under present-day law. The
Commission would have had to exclude Negroes from a municipal
golf course. Such exclusion is unlawful since the decisions by the
United States Supreme Court in late 1955 in the Holnes and
Dawson cases.18 4 It is of course true that Barringerwas decided
before Holmws and Dawson, thus, in a technical sense the law had
not yet been established. Nevertheless, it was clearly foreseeable.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that racial discrimination by a
public body in the use of public facilities is against national public
policy.
All of which makes the denial of certiorari by the United States
182. D2eeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n, 350 U.S. 983
(1956).
183. 289 Ill. 289, 124 N.E. 652 (1919).
184. Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (held a denial of equal
protection to exclude Negroes from municipally-owned golf course) ; Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (unconstitutional to deny Negroes
access to public bathing beaches).
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Supreme Court inexplicable. In so doing it left standing a case
which bids fair to undercut the effectiveness of the Shelley v. Kraeier doctrine, a case which cries out for authoritative decision. Of
course, the Court has discretion in such matters. It can review or
not as it wishes. But even so, the Court does have a responsibility
to render decisions on constitutional questions, a responsibility
which should not be lightly shrugged off. Having assumed the
power of decision, and exercising it for more than 150 years, the
Court is hardly fulfilling its high judicial purpose when it leaves
the type of question raised in the Barringercase unresolved. 18
As with the question of the validity of the reverter clause itself,
so it is with the second question left unanswered by the Barringer
case; that it would do no violence to accepted methods and notions
for the North Carolina court to have found state action in the fact
that title to the land would revest in the grantor on the happening
of the contingency "by operation of law." Such a finding would
be an extension of the state action doctrine of the Shelley and Barrows cases, but it is a logical one, perhaps the next logical move.
For law, despite neverending arguments over definitions, exists
only when the full force of society acting through government is
behind it. As was said by Justice Brandeis, quoting Justice Holmes,
" 'law in the sense in which the courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law
so far as it is enforced in A state ... [is] the law of that State existing by authority of that State.' "Ill The reverter clause in Barringer did operate "automatically," as the North Carolina court
185. The Court moves in mysterious ways its wonders to perform. It
will refuse to review a case and leave the decision below standing while at
the same time stoutly maintaining that its decision is not to be construed
as indicative of its feeling on the issues of the case denied review. But of
course the Court is relatively alone on that position. In the mind of the general
public at least and perhaps generally throughout the bar, a denial of certiorari
is given more weight.
But it is a fairly general practice. One reason for the refusal to review
the Barringerdecision may be that members of the Court feel that they have
gone about as far as is feasible at this time in altering the legal pattern in
racial relations. The school cases and the recreation cases taken together
make a large mouthful for the South to chew and swallow. In going that far,
the Court took what may certainly be thought of as a calculated risk. The
reaction generated in the South may have been enough for the Court to steer
clear of further acerbation of conditions. This could serve to explain, partially at least, the Court's action in the Barringcr case as well as its seizing
upon the weakest and flimsiest of reasons to refuse to make a decision in the
Virginia miscegenation case. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). A
subsequent opinion in the Nain case may be found in 1 Race Relations L. Rep.
404 (1956).
186. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. 79 (1938).
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maintained, but that was true only because North Carolina law
(with the full force of the state behind it) allowed it to do so.18
The third question left dangling by the North Carolina court
is basically similar to those already discussed. That question is,
would an action of ejectment brought by the holder of the reversionary interest against a recalcitrant grantee who refused to give
up the property involve state action within the scope of the doctrine
of Shelley v. Kraenter? While this question could be decided by a
court using conceptualistic reasoning-stating that the court would
not be enforcing the racial condition but merely removing a person
whose right to possession had terminated automatically upon breach
of the condition-the result would be that the racial clause would
be enforced by indirection. As the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
,15
it is as much state action to "deny to
said in Clifton v. Puente,
a person a legal right to which he would be entitled except for the
covenant as it would be to expressly command by judicial order
that the terms of the covenant be recognized and carried out." The
same sort of reasoning would apply in the converse situation. Suppose the reversioner got possession in some manner and the grantee
sought to eject him, with the reversioner setting up "title" through
automatic reversion as a defense. Conceptualistically, this could provide a basis for decision. But again, the true nature and the practical result would be the same, indirect enforcement of a racial clause
which admittedly could not be directly enforced.
What a court would do in such a situation depends in part on
the extent to which it would be willing to pierce the form of a
situation and get to the substance. In other words, the question
would be whether the court would be willing to cut through to the
187. However, it is clear that if this line of argument is followed and
accepted, then it would be difficult to see what activities would fail to be state
action. For example, a country club limiting its membership on racial
grounds gains its status through the operation of the law in which it exists.
If it is state action for the automatic operation of a fee simple determinable,
then why wouldn't it be equally state action when a state agency incorporated
the country club? The principle seems to be the same in both cases. ,That.
then, is the end? Once the concept of state action is pushed beyond the usual
activities of state organs into situations usually considered to be private or
nonofficial, then it would seem that there would be no limit to what could
be called state action. Some have suggested that the fourteenth amendment
was designed to eliminate individual acts of discrimination. See Flack,
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 262-63 (1908). But the Court has
never so held.
In the final analysis, what is state action depends, as in all constitutional
questions, upon what the Supreme Court says it is. And what the Court says
is, as usual, based in turn upon notions of what good public policy should be
at the time the decision is rendered. There exists no table of logarithms, no
formula, no vade-mecum by which this decision may be made.
188. 218 S.AV2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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core and recognize the practical results of a decision. Whether it
would or not depends, in final analysis, not on a judge's view of
what "the law" is, for here the judge must choose between competing statements of law. Rather, it depends upon subjective views
of what the individual judicial decision-maker believes is desirable
or acceptable social policy in the world as it is today.'"9
C. Evaluation
We may be moving into an entire new era in the field of racial
relations. At a time when the Negro and other minority groups are
battling to attain formal equality in treatment from official bodies
-and certainly that battle is far from won, although significant
strides have been made-there seems to be a parallel movement
developing. Perhaps by inadvertence, perhaps by design, there are
definite indications that more than the absence of official governmental acts of discrimination is wanted. Of course, the Negro wants
"first class citizenship" with full voting rights and an opportunity
to enjoy fully the facilities-recreational, educational, and the like
-which his taxes help pay for. But he wants, and is demanding,
more; full and free opportunity for employment for one thing. The
parallel movement, thus, is one which is aimed at crumbling the
walls of racial discrimination in activities and institutions long con.
sidered to be entirely within the domain of "private" action.
Seen in this light then, the actions of the Negro applicants 1o
gain entry into Girard College take on added significance. It could
well be the opening gun in a battle to breach the walls of private
education. At the very least, it attempts to add another large segment to the expanding net of state action. Hence, the case has importance for the private school administrator in two ways. One is
that just stated, a possible attack on the admission policies of pri189. This statement does not, of course, coincide with what Morris R.
Cohen called the "phonograph" theory of justice and what others have called
the "slot machine" theory of the judicial process. Those theories, long exploded but still hanging tenaciously on, are bottomed on the view that a
judge has no creative role in making a decision, but merely applies known
law to the facts in a mechanical fashion. The job of the judge is to find the
law. After that the result is preordained. This naive notion is part of the
basic theory that ours is a government "of laws, not of men." A present-day
variation is the hue and cry from Southern spokesmen that the Supreme
Court engaged in "judicial legislation" in the Segregation Cases. The simple
truth of the matter is that the judiciary have always "legislated," that is to
say, have always been policy-makers. The common law itself is a product of
this process. A judge cannot avoid making policy-"legislating'"-when lie
renders a decision. See Cahill. Judicial Legislation (1952) ; Cardozo. The
Nature of the Judicial Process (1921): L.evi, An Introduction
Reasoning (1949).

to Legal
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vate schools. The other is in the possibility that the ultimate outcome will be the elimination of racial clauses in trusts and grants
of funds or property through the judicial recognition of a public
policy against such clauses or a judicial outlawing of them.
Whether either one of these possibilities will take place is pure
speculation. But it is not so speculative to say that the demands
the colored ten per cent of the American population are making are
aimed at more than the elimination of official discriminations. That
being so, it is possible to forecast that a continued use of law and
the American legal machinery will be made as the Negro continues
his efforts to gain full status in the American social structure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

We have discussed the legal problems inherent in any attempt
of a private school to admit both Negroes and whites to its student
body. A number of conclusions, most of them admittedly tentative,
have been drawn. Others may now be added.
Before doing so, it is important to point out that the problems
discussed are but one facet of the over-all question of Negro-white
relations in the United States and the changes which will be made
in existing patterns of practice in those relations. An understanding of the aspirations of the Negro citizens, together with insight
into the fears of the white citizens about the Negroes, would seem
to be indispensable to an understanding of Negro-white relations
now and in the future. The legal problems involved, whether in
education or elsewhere, spring after all out of the greater milieu
and are to be understood only as a part of that context. A valid
view of the problem of racial integration of the private schools has
to include insight into the over-all pattern.
But it is precisely there that we do not have that exact knowledge of factual conditions which is a prerequisite to understanding.
We do not know, save in the broadest of generalities and then only
from a few spokesmen, what the Negroes actually want. We do not
know, except for certain emotion-packed statements, what it is that
the white man fears and dislikes about close association with the
Negro. The thrust of race relations, if not of all society, is manifestly toward the creation of conditions of equality. In the past one
hundred years the Negro has vaulted from slavery to a position of
being able to insure equality of treatment from governmental officials. Possibly, the dynamics of the Negro movement will allow
the Negro to stop when the goal of equality under the law has full
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operational reality as well as reality in the statements of courts and
legislatures, at such time, that is, that the Negro is in fact accorded
full access to all public privileges or services. Possibly, however,
the movement will continue until the Negro reaches that equality
of conditions which de Tocqueville thought was the unique feature
of the United States. For, as de Tocqueville also said, equality in
several areas of life will ineluctably result in equality in all: "To
conceive of men remaining forever unequal upon one single point,
yet equal in all others, is impossible; they must come in the end to be
equal upon all."
The demands being made by the Negro, the demands which
he will be making in the future, the reaction that the white man
and society generally makes to those demands-all of this we do
not know. And not knowing it, any conclusions which we have
drawn or may draw from the present study can be based only upon
incomplete evidence and those trends which are presently discernable. For the dynamics of the Negro movement will unavoidably
color and influence the conditions under which all education will
operate. With that limitation in mind, what can be said about the
intermixture of the races in denominational and other private
schools ?
1. As a beginning, we can state that opposition, whether of
governmental official or private individual, to a private school integrating the races will vary in relation to the incidence of Negroes
to whites in the geographical area in which the school operates,
and, in addition, will vary in direct proportion to the number of
Negroes who are admitted to a former all-white school (regardless
of geographical area). The first half of this statement is obvious
from what has transpired since the May 1954 decision in the public
school segregation cases. The greatest opposition to the decision
has come from the areas where the Negroes are thickest populationwise. The second half is not so obvious, but nevertheless it is valid.
\Vhen it is seen that the white students in any public school will
far outnumber the colored, then the opposition is slight at most
and easily overcome. The same thing can be said about a private
school. No problem that cannot be easily handled arises anywhere
if the private school admits one or even several Negroes. This has
happened often at all levels of education and in some of the most
highly regarded private schools in the country. But it would be
quite another matter for any school to admit one hundred Negroes
or, say, twenty or thirty per cent of its student body. It is doubt-
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ful indeed, should such an unlikely event take place, that it would
be accomplished without incident. And geography would have
nothing to do with the matter.
The point is that any institution or group (e.g., a fraternity or
sorority) can easily assimilate into its ranks one or even a few
who do not fully conform to the usual characteritics of its members.
The group can even take pride in or gain satisfaction from such
an "enlightened" policy. But what would happen if the institution
or group was faced with the possibility that half its membership
were to be "strange" or "nonconforming"? The conclusion must
be that there would be strong opposition not only from the "ins"
of the group but also from those outside (alumni, donors, etc.)
who feel closely identified with it or are otherwise affected or influenced by it. Racial integration in the private schools of the
North, through which a handful of Negroes are admitted to schools
formerly denied to them, proves nothing so far as the creation of
a model for other schools is concerned.
2. In those sections of the South where the incidence of colored
to white is greatest-in the so-called "black belt"-any publicized
decision by a private school administration to integrate would probably be met by strong opposition. This hostility would be from official (governmental) and non-official (private) sources.
Publicity would seem to be the key factor here, and also the
number of schools involved is of importance. An individual private
school, operating quietly and without fanfare, could probably admit
Negroes and suffer few, if any, adverse consequences. Evidence of
this may be found in the examples of Spring Hill College in Mobile,
Alabama, Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, and Loy-

ola University in New Orleans, Louisiana. Although these examples are at the university level where it is demonstrated that the
least opposition is made to racial integration, they were done quietly and without public announcement. Compare the furore which
was raised when Archbishop Rummel announced the decision to
integrate the parochial schools of Louisiana. The publicity (plus
the number of schools involved) caused an immediate fierce
reaction.

Lack of publicity. means a concomitant lack of wide public
knowledge and the opportunity for public officials to ignore the
occurrence. The officials can close their eyes, even when the integration means the violation of state law. No one is putting pressure
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upon them. Accordingly, they are not forced to make a decision.
Let, however, the integration become widely publicized, let it have
the cognizance of the mass of the people, and it is likely that the
officials would have to make a decision. When that time comes, the
result is entirely predictable. The officials would be forced to take
action to uphold the statute or, in any event, to oppose the integration policy. To a large extent, it can be said that what took place
in the over-publicized Autherine Lucy incident at the University
of Alabama is an illustration of this point.
3. Mentioned in Section II was the fact that in some of the
states, notably Kentucky, Tennessee and Oklahoma, which have
statutory provisions designed to prevent integration of private
schools, a number of institutions of higher learning have announced
and put into effect integration policies without adverse reaction.
Just why this challenge to state law has been allowed to go on
without official objection is a question for which there is no ready
answer. Whether it will be allowed to continue unhampered in like
fashion cannot be answered. Should, however, governmental sanctions be invoked at some time against an integrating school and its
administration it is likely that the sanctions would eventually be
found to be invalid under the Constitution. The reach of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
would appear to be great enough to proscribe both affirmative acts
of discrimination by state governments and governmental actions
designed to make individuals follow discriminatory practices. The
Constitution, in other words, not only means that governments must
be color-blind but further that governments cannot require individuals to make color distinctions.
4. It would, however, be far more difficult to get a judicial decision of invalidation should the ,state outwardly comply with a
policy of nondiscrimination but administratively make distinctions
so that law is in fact applied with an uneven hand. The difficulties
relate to proof, however, and not to the principle involved. The
law would be clear. It may be somewhat of a burden to prove violations.
Should a law enforcement official seek to enforce strictly a safety or sanitary regulation or other example of the state's police
power against an integrating private school, in all probability this
would be found to be almost impossible to combat judicially. It is
a breakdown of the democratic system for such occurences to take
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place, but there is nothing in the Constitution which would prevent
such action. The lengths to which officials could go would be limited only by their imagination and perhaps their consciences.
5. It is in the area of unofficial sanctions privately imposed that
the school could suffer the most severe deprivations. Physically,
economically, psychologically, the techniques of social control which
could be brought to bear would transcend those which the state
could do officially. The school administrators, faculty and students
all could feel the full weight of social pressures exerted by other
members of the status groups with which they lived. These sanctions
are in the realm of private action which could not, under any tenable theory, be brought within the reach of law.
6. If it is true that the dynamics of the Negro movement will
include efforts to breach the walls of separation and discrimination
in whatever form they take and wherever located, then it is possible
that an attempt will be made to have racial admission barriers in
private education lowered by court action. In one sense, this would
be the next logical step for the flow of doctrine to take. It is a step
which could be taken without doing too much damage to existing
concepts and principles. But in this area and, for that matter, in
other areas of constitutional interpretation, logic plays at best a
minor role. It is unlikely that a court would take the step, now or
in the foreseeable future.
7. Nevertheless, it can be forecast with some certainty that efforts will be made to have racial clauses in private agreements outlawed as a matter of public policy. The decisions in recent years
have been edging toward that end. In fact, it can be said that the
purport of recent decisions in racial cases has been to make the
racial clauses in effect a dead letter.
8. The denominational school would, as a general rule, be
treated in the same manner as other private schools. A possible
argument which could be made is that a state statute seeking to
regulate the activities of parochial schools is invalid as a violation

of the first amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. However, there does not appear to be any real substance in such an
argument, for under existing doctrine the parochial school would
doubtless be held to be a "practice of religion" and thus subject to
regulation. Such regulation could be directed toward admission
practices of denominational schools. A statute vhich forbade re-
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fusal of admission on racial grounds would be upheld in the event
of an attack based on religious freedom grounds.
9. Finally, it may well be that racial integration in the denominational and other private schools will be the wedge which opens
the doors of the public schools in many parts of the South. If the
pattern already started in an increasing number of private institutions of desegregating their student bodies continues, then the private school may operate as a proving ground for testing racial relations in education. Assuming some comparatively high degree
of success in private school integration, the road ahead for the
public schools may possibly be found. If the fears, rational or irrational, of the white man are not realized in one system of education, perhaps he will withdraw his opposition to integration in the
other (public) school system.
Accordingly, what happens in the nonpublic schools in the South
and elsewhere has an importance which transcends the school itself.
As a testing ground for new patterns of racial relations, it could
be the harbinger of things to come. Whether the future will inchde
general racial integration or not may depend, to some large extent,
upon the individuals now groping their way on to the unfamiliar
ground of Negro-white educational commingling in the South.

